ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his study examines the association between corporate reputation and the quality of a firm's earnings. Earnings quality is an issue of increasing importance to investors especially after recent financial scandals and crises. Identifying signals of earnings quality would be useful to investors and others. To examine whether there is an association between firm reputation and earnings quality, we use a public measure -"America's Most Admired Companies" -as a proxy for reputation. Fortune magazine has published annually a list of most-admired American companies since 1983. Firms on this list are selected by executives, directors, and securities analysts based on eight key areas. These areas are financial soundness, ability to attract and retain talented employees, quality of management, social responsibility, innovation, quality of products or service, wise use of assets, and investment value. Firms selected to this list are considered to possess a superior reputation.
An underlying assumption of the above selection criteria is that the companies' accounting practices have integrity, otherwise many of these measures, like financial soundness, wise use of assets and investment value would become meaningless. As a result, we expect that firms on the "America's Most Admired Companies" list have accounting practices with more integrity and higher earnings quality. Companies use discretion when applying accounting practices. With this discretion comes the possibility for both honest mistakes and dishonest mistakes, such as intentional manipulation of earnings. The intentional manipulation of earnings leads to lower earnings quality. To capture the earnings quality, we rely on the modified Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality. That is, a higher absolute value of discretionary accruals suggests lower earnings quality.
Our regression analysis reports a significant and negative relationship between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and reputation. The results suggest that firms with superior reputation also have superior quality in their earnings. Our results should be of interest to managers who engage in behavior leading to or maintaining a positive corporate reputation, to financial analysts who conduct research on determining the earnings quality of a firm. Moreover, our study can increase individual investors' confidence in assessing the earnings quality of companies with a superior reputation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design, including measurement of earnings quality, empirical specifications, sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the results of our regression analysis, and Section 5 summarizes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Reputation is defined by Fombrun (1996, p.72) as "a perceptual representation of a company's past actions and future prospects that describe the firm's overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals." Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest that corporate reputation is a general organizational attribute that reflects the extent to which external stakeholders view the company as "good" and "bad". How does a good reputation affect a company? Based on Fombrun (1996) , strategic management theory suggests that good reputation may create competitive advantages for firms, and strategic researchers also view a good reputation as a unique asset to a firm. Dowling (2001) suggests that the main drivers of reputation creation are embedded inside the firm. That is, characteristics of the company's own performance drive reputation. A large body of empirical research (e.g. Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Herremans et al., 1993; Landon and Smith, 1997) has examined the relation between a firm's reputation and its performance. These empirical studies support a positive relationship between reputation and economic performance.
McLaughlin et al. (1996) find that most-admired firms tend to be highly profitable and to grow quickly. In addition, they find that firms on the most-admired list tend to acquire other firms. Similar to McLaughlin et al. (1996) , Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest that a firm with a good reputation may possess a cost advantage, since people prefer to work for firms with high reputations, and they work harder. Also, suppliers prefer to do business with high-reputation firms in order to reduce contractual hazards. Therefore, Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest that firms with superior reputation are better able to maintain superior profitability over time.
From a capital market point of view, Antunovich and Laster (1999) investigate the stock returns of firms on the most-admired list from 1982 to 1995. They documented that the most-admired decile of firms significantly outperformed the least-admired decile. Moreover, their findings reveal that even five years after the publication of the most-admired list the most-admired decile earned an average annual return of 17.7 percent, while the leastadmired decile only earned 12.5 percent. Damodaran (2003) suggests that investors should buy stocks of companies with a good reputation for products and management. The rationale was that a well-run company should be worth more than a poorly-run company. Anderson and Smith (2006) examine a portfolio of the stocks of firms on the most-admired list. They find that their portfolio of these stocks outperformed the market (proxied by S&P 500 Index), whether these stocks were purchased on the publication date, or 5, 10, 15 or even 20 trading days later. However, Anderson and Smith (2006) do not offer an explanation for their findings. investigate the market values of firms with superior reputation. By using the Ohlson (1995) model, report that firms with high reputation had an average market value premium of $1.3 billion. They conclude that firms with superior reputation are highly-valued by the capital markets. Chun (2005) reports that many academic disciplines have shown interest in reputation research. Accounting studies which examine the association between reputation and accounting variables have started to emerge. Francis et al. (2008) examine the association between CEO reputation and earnings quality. Using the extent of press coverage as proxy for CEO reputation, they find that more highly reputed CEOs are associated with poorer earnings quality. They conclude that firms with poor earnings quality required more highly reputed CEOs. By using a list of firms in China, Tan (2007) investigates the association between corporate reputation and earnings quality. Tan (2007) also uses a public measure -"World's Most Respected Companies in China" -as a proxy for reputation. However, the results in Tan (2007) are inconclusive. Our study extends these studies in a number of ways. First, we focus on corporate reputation while Francis et al. (2008) focus on CEO reputation. Next, we use a more complete measure of earnings quality than Tan (2007) . For example, it is unknown whether Tan (2007) estimates parameters of the cross-sectional model using all other firms in the same industry.
Based on the underlying assumption that firms on the "America's Most Admired Companies" list have accounting practices with more integrity and, as a result, less earnings manipulation, we posit that firms with superior reputation also have superior earnings quality.
Ha:
There is a positive association between firm reputation and earnings quality.
RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Measurement of the Primary Variable -Earnings Quality
Prior research generally uses one of the two approaches to measure earnings quality. The first approach captures earnings quality by examining accounting variables. For example, Sloan (1996) 
We use the first approach. Specifically, we measure earnings quality by investigating the level of discretionary accruals. We use the modified Jones (1991) model and a cross-sectional estimation method to capture discretionary accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality. That is, a higher absolute value of discretionary accruals suggests lower earnings quality.
Total accruals (TA) are measured as follows:
Where NI i,t = firm i's net income (Compustat #18) in year t, CFFO i,t = firm i's cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) in year t.
In order to estimate discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, we first estimate parameters of the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model using all other firms in the same industry (same first two-digit SIC as firm i). The model is as follows:
Where TA j,t = industry j's total accruals in year t, ΔREV j,t = industry j's change in revenue (Compustat Item #12) between year (t-1) and year t, ΔRECE j,t = industry j's change in receivables (Compustat Item #2) between year (t-1) and year t, PPE j,t = industry j's gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat Item #7) at the end of year t, A j,t-1 = industry j's the total assets (Comustat Item #6) at the end of year t-1.
The industry-specific estimates of parameters from Equation (2) imply an expected association between non-discretionary accruals and accounting variables for firms in industry j. Thus, the non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t can be computed as follows:
The absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t is computed as follows:
Empirical Specification
We use the following regression to test the association between corporate reputation and earnings quality.
| DA i,t | = β 0 + β 1 *Reputation + β 2 *TA i,t + β 3 *LEV i,t + β 4 *MTB i,t + ε Three variables are included to control for firm size, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
We Table 1 reconciles the sample selection process. Panel B in Table 1 presents the sample's distribution across broad industry categories. For instance, 105 out of the 223 firms are from the manufacturing industries, while only one firm is from the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of selected variables from sample firms and matched firms. These variables include the absolute value of discretionary accruals (| DA|), total assets (TA), total debt (TD), leverage (LEV), the market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). For sample firms, the mean and median values of | DA| are 0.0129 and 0.009, respectively. For matched firms, the mean and median values of | DA| are 0.0166 and 0.0108, respectively. It appears that sample firms on average have lower discretionary accruals, relative to matched firms.
Sample firm control variables of have higher mean and median values than those of matched firms except for the leverage ratio (LEV). For instance, the mean value of total assets of the sample firms is $24,390.32, while the mean value of total assets of the matched firms is $18,390.09. The above findings are not surprising Table 2 reports mean paired differences between sample firms and matched firms. We use both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test to measure the significance of differences. Both tests indicate that the paired differences in the absolute value of discretionary accruals, total assets, the leverage ratio (LEV) and return on assets (ROA) are significant. ; LEV = total debt/total asset; MTB = market-to-book ratio; ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity. Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in Table 2 . Some variables are correlated at a significant level. The correlation coefficient between the absolute value of discretionary accruals (| DA|) and reputation is -0.0959, with a p-value of 0.043. This implies a significant and negative relationship between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and total assets. In addition, the correlation coefficient between total assets (TA) and reputation is 0.0853, with a p-value of 0.072. This suggests that firms with good reputations are larger firms. 
RESULTS
To test our hypothesis that firms with high reputation have high earnings quality, we run the regression model (Equation 5) . If the hypothesis is true, we expect a significant and negative relation between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and corporate reputation. Table 4 reports the results of our regression analysis. As shown in Table 4 , β 1 is -0.00388 and significant at p = 0.0366. Thus, our hypothesis is supported. We included three control variables in our regression analysis. Results indicate the absolute value of discretionary accruals is positively
